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Abstract: The Sybil attack in unknown port networks such as wireless is not
considered tractable. A wireless node is not capable of independently differentiating
the universe of real nodes from the universe of arbitrary non-existent fictitious nodes
created by the attacker. Similar to failure detectors, we propose to use universe
detectors to help nodes determine which universe is real. In this paper, we (i)
define several variants of the neighborhood discovery problem under Sybil attack
(ii) propose a set of matching universe detectors (iii) demonstrate the necessity of
additional topological constraints for the problems to be solvable: node density
and communication range; (iv) present SAND — an algorithm that solves these
problems with the help of appropriate universe detectors, this solution demonstrates
that the proposed universe detectors are the weakest detectors possible for each
problem.
Key-words: Sybil attack, wireles network, unverse detector
De´tecteurs d’Univers pour la De´fense contre les
Attaques Sybilles dans les Re´seaux Ad Hoc Sans Fil
Re´sume´ : Le proble`me de l’attaque Sybille dans les re´seaux a` ports inconus comme
les re´seaux sans fil n’est pas conside´re´ comme soluble. Un nœud sans fil n’est pas
capable de diffe´rencier par lui meˆme un univers de nœuds re´els d’un univers de
nœuds fictifs cre´e´ par un attaquant.
De manie`re similaires aux de´tecteurs de de´faillances, nous proposons d’utiliser
des de´tecteurs d’univers pour aider les nœuds a` de´terminer quel univers est re´el.
Dans cet article, nous (i) de´finissons plusieurs variantes du proble`me de de´couverte
de voisinage en pre´sence d’attaques Sybilles; (ii) nous pre´sentons un ensemble de
de´tecteurs d’univers correspondants; (iii) nous prouvons la ne´cessite´ d’utiliser des
contraintes topologiques supple´mentaires pour que le proble`me devienne soluble: la
densite´ des nœuds et la porte´e de communication; (iv) nous pre´sentons SAND,
un algorithme distribue´ qui re´soud les proble`mes propose´s a` l’aide des de´tecteurs
d’univers approprie´s, et montrons que les de´tecteurs d’univers sont les plus faibles
possibles pour chaque proble`me.
Mots-cle´s : Attaque Sybille, re´seau sans fil, de´tecteur d’univers
Universe Detectors for Sybil Defense 3
1 Introduction
A Sybil attack, formulated by Douceur [9], is intriguing in its simplicity. However,
such an attack can incur substantial damage to the computer system. In a Sybil
attack, the adversary is able to compromise the system by creating an arbitrary
number of identities that the system perceives as separate. If the attack is success-
ful, the adversary may either overwhelm the system resources, thus channeling the
attack into denial-of-service [25], or create more sophisticated problems, e.g. routing
infrastructure breakdown [12].
Ad hoc wireless networks, such as a sensor networks, are a potential Sybil attack
target. The ad hoc nature of such networks may result in scenarios where each node
starts its operation without the knowledge of even its immediate neighborhood let
alone the complete network topology. Yet, the broadcast nature of the wireless
communication prevents each node from recognizing whether the messages that it
receives are sent by the same or different senders. Thus, an attacker may be free
to either create an arbitrary number of fictitious identities or impersonate already
existing real nodes. The problem straddles the security and fault tolerance domains
as the attacker may be either a malicious intruder or a node experiencing Byzantine
fault. A fault is Buzantine [14] if the faulty node disregards the program code and
behaves arbitrarily. For convenience, in this paper we assume that the attacker is a
faulty node rather than intruder.
Problem motivation. A standard way of establishing trust between communi-
cating parties is by employing cryptography. There is a number of publications
addressing the Sybil attack in this manner [8, 16, 19, 23, 26, 27, 29]. For example,
if each node has access to verified certificates and every sender digitally signs its
messages, then the receiver can unambiguously determine the sender and discard
superfluous identities created by the faulty node by checking the digital signature
of the message against the certificates. However, there are several reasons for this
approach to be inappropriate. A cryptography-based solution pre-supposes a key-
based infrastructure which requires its maintenance and update and thus limits its
applicability. Moreover, resource constrained devices, such as sensor nodes in sensor
networks, may not be able to handle cryptographic operations altogether.
Another approach is intrusion detection based on reputation [1, 5, 11]. Due
to the broadcast nature of wireless communication, the messages from each node
are observed by its neighbors. A fault is detected if the node deviates from the
protocol. It is unclear how reputation-based schemes would fare if the messages
cannot be matched to the sender: the faulty node may impersonate other nodes
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or create an arbitrary number of fictitious nodes and set up its own alternative
reputation verification network.
However, there are two unique features of wireless communication that make
defense against the Sybil attack possible. The wireless communication is broadcast.
Thus, the message transmission of a faulty node is received by all nodes in its
vicinity. In addition, the nodes can estimate the received signal strength (RSS) of
the message and make judgments of the location of the sender on its basis. Note
that the latter is not straightforward as the faulty node can change its transmission
signal strength (TSS). In this paper we investigate the approaches to Sybil defense
using this property of wireless communication.
Related literature. Newsome et al [18] as well as Shi and Perrig [22] survey various
defenses against the Sybil attack. They stress the promise of the type of technique
we consider. Demirbas and Song [7] consider using the RSS for Sybil defense.
A line of inquiry that is related to Sybil defense is secure location identification [2,
13, 15, 21, 24]. In this case, a set of trusted nodes attempt to verify the location
of a possibly malicious or faulty node. However, the establishment of such trusted
network is not addressed. Hence, this approach may not be useful for Sybil defense.
Delae¨t et al [6], and Hwang et al [10] consider the problem where the faulty node
operates synchronously with the other nodes. Delae¨t et al [6] provided examples of
positioning of faulty nodes and their strategies that lead to neighborhood discovery
compromise. Note that the synchrony assumption places a bound on the number of
distinct identities that the faulty node can assume before the correct nodes begin
to counter its activities. Even though the faulty node may potentially create the
infinite number of fictitious identities, the correct nodes have to deal with no more
than several of them at a time. However, this approach simplifies the problem as it
limits the power of the faulty node and the strength of the attack.
Nesterenko and Tixeuil [17] describe how, despite Byzantine faults, every node
can determine the complete topology of the network despite once each node recog-
nizes its immediate neighbors. Thus, to defend against the Sybil attack it is sufficient
to locally solve Byzantine-robust neighborhood discovery.
Note that the problem is trivial when the ports are known. In this case, the
receiver may not know the identity of the transmitter of the message but can match
the same transmitter across messages. This prohibits the faulty node from creating
more than a single fictitious identity or impersonating other real nodes and allows
a simple solution.
Our approach and contribution. We consider the problem of neighbor identifi-
cation in the presence of Byzantine nodes. The nodes are embedded in a geometric
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plane and know their location. They do not have access to cryptographic opera-
tions. The nodes can exchange arbitrary messages, but the only information about
the message that the receiver can reliably obtain is its RSS. We consider the asyn-
chronous model of execution. That is, the execution speed of any pair of nodes in
the network can differ arbitrarily. This enables the faulty node to create an arbitrary
number of fictitious identities or impersonate the correct nodes in an arbitrary way.
Moreover, in this model, the only unique identities that the nodes have are their
coordinates. Hence, the objective of each node is to collect the coordinates of its
neighbors. We focus on local solutions to the neighborhood discovery. That is, each
node only processes messages from the correct neighbors within a certain fixed dis-
tance. We do not consider a denial-of-service attack or jamming attack [25], where
the faulty nodes just overwhelm resources of the system by continuously transmit-
ting arbitrary messages. We assume that the network has sufficient bandwidth for
message exchanges and the nodes have sufficient memory and computing resources
to process them. To the best of our knowledge, this is the most general model of
Sybil defense considered to-date.
In Section 2 we provide details for our execution model and formally state several
variants of the neighborhood discovery problem. Sections 3, 4, 5, and 6 outline the
boundaries of the achievable. In Section 3, we formally prove that this problem is not
solvable without outside help. Intuitively, the faulty node may create a universe of
an arbitrary number of fictitious identities whose messages are internally consistent
and the correct node has no way of differentiating those from the universe of correct
nodes. In Section 4, we introduce universe detectors as a way to help nodes select
the correct universe. The idea is patterned after failure detectors [4]. Just like failure
detectors, universe detectors are not implementable in asynchronous systems. How-
ever, they provide a convenient abstraction that separates the concerns of algorithm
design and implementation of the necessary synchrony and other details that enable
the solution to Sybil defense. However, unlike failure detectors, universe detectors
alone are insufficient to allow a solution to the neighborhood discovery problem. If
the density of the network is too sparse, the faulty nodes may introduce a fictitious
identity such that the detector is rendered unable to help the correct nodes. In
Section 5, we prove the necessary condition for the location of the correct nodes to
allow a solution to the neighborhood discovery problem. However, the faulty node
may still be able to compromise the operation of correct nodes. For that, a faulty
node may assume the identity of a correct node and discredit it by sending incorrect
messages to other nodes. In Section 6 we prove another necessary condition for the
minimum transmission range of correct nodes that eliminates this problem.
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In Section 7 we present a Sybil-attack resilient neighborhood discovery algorithm
SAND that uses the universe detectors to solve the neighborhood discovery problem
provided that the necessary conditions are met. In their study of failure detectors
Chandra et al [3] defined the weakest failure detector as the necessary detector
to solve the problem that they are deployed to address. With the introduction of
SAND, we show that the employed detectors are the weakest detectors necessary to
solve the neighborhood discovery problem. In Section 8, we conclude the paper by
discussing the implementation details of the algorithm and the attendant universe
detectors.
2 Computation Model Description, Assumptions, No-
tation and Definitions
A computer network consists of nodes embedded in a geometric plane. Each node is
aware of its own coordinates. A (node) layout is a particular set of nodes and their
locations on the plane. Unless explicitly restricted, we assume that the node layout
can be arbitrary. Any specific point on the plane can be occupied by at most one
node. Thus, the node’s coordinates on the plane uniquely identify it. The nodes
have no other identifiers. For ease of exposition, we use identifiers at the end of
the alphabet such as u or v to refer to the particular locations or non-faulty nodes
occupying them. We use f and k respectively to refer to a faulty node and a location
where the faulty node may pretend to be located. The distance between u and v is
|uv|. The neighborhood set or just neighborhood of a node u is a set of nodes whose
distance to u is less than a certain fixed distance dn.
Program model. We assume the asynchronous model of algorithm execution.
That is, the difference between the execution speed of any pair of nodes can be
arbitrarily large. Note that this asynchrony assumption allows any node, including
a faulty one, to send an arbitrary number of messages before other nodes are able to
respond. The nodes run a distributed algorithm. The algorithm consists of variables
and actions. A (global) state of the algorithm is an assignment of values to all its
variables. An action is enabled in a state if it can be executed at this state. A
computation is a maximal fair sequence of algorithm states starting from a certain
prescribed initial state s0 such that for each state si, the next state si+1 is obtained
by atomically executing an action that is enabled in si. Maximality of a computation
means that the computation is either infinite or terminates where none of the actions
are enabled. In other words, a computation cannot be a proper prefix of another
computation. Fairness means that if an action is enabled in all but finitely many
INRIA
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states of an infinite computation then this action is executed infinitely often. That
is, we assume weak fairness of action execution. During a single computation, node
layout is fixed.
Nodes can be either correct or faulty (Byzantine). A faulty node does not have
to follow the steps of the algorithm and can behave arbitrarily throughout the com-
putation.
Node communication. Nodes communicate by broadcasting messages. As the dis-
tance to the sender increases, the signal fades. We assume the free space model [20] of
signal propagation. The antennas are omnidirectional. The received signal strength
(RSS) changes as follows:
R = cT/r2 (1)
where R is the RSS, c is a constant, T is the transmitted (or sent) signal strength
(TSS), and r is the distance from the sender to the receiver. We assume that r cannot
be arbitrarily small. Thus, R is always finite. There is a minimum signal strength
Rmin at which the message can still be received. There is no message loss. That is, if
a message is sent with TSS — T ′, then every node within distance r′ =
√
cT ′/Rmin
of the sender receives the message. We do not consider interference, hidden-terminal
effect or other causes of message loss. We assume that every correct node always
broadcasts with a certain fixed strength Tr. A range rt is defined as
√
cTr/Rmin.
The relation between range rt and neighborhood distance dn is, in general, arbitrary.
A faulty node may select arbitrary TSS. If a node receives a message (i.e. if the RSS
is greater than Rmin), then the node can accurately measure the RSS.
To simplify the exposition we assume that the nodes transmit three types of
messages: (i) u transmits announce, this message has only the information about u
and carries u’s coordinates; the purpose of an announcement is for u to advertise its
presence to its neighbors; (ii) u transmits confirm of another node v’s transmission;
(iii) u transmits conflict with another node v’s transmission if its observations do not
match the location or the contents of v’s message. The original message is attached
in confirm and conflict. Every message contains the coordinates of the sender.
Fictitious nodes and conflicts. Since the only way to unambiguously differen-
tiate the nodes is by their location, the objective of every node is to determine the
coordinates of its neighbors. Faulty nodes may try to disrupt this process by making
the correct node assume that it has a non-existent neighbor. Such a non-existent
neighbor is fictitious. A node that indeed exists in the layout is real. Note that a
real node can still be either correct or faulty. Faulty nodes may try to tune their
TSS and otherwise transmit messages such that it appears to the correct nodes that
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the message comes from a fictitious node. Moreover, the faulty nodes may try to
make their transmissions appear to have come from correct nodes.
As a node receives messages, due to the actions of a faulty node, the collected
information may be contradictory. A conflict consists of a message of any type
purportedly coming from node k, yet the received signal strength at node u does
not match |uk| provided that the signal were broadcast from k with the TSS of Tr.
A conflict is explicit if u receives this conflicting message. Note that the RSS may
be so low that u is unable to receive the message altogether, even though the RSS
at u should be greater than Rmin in case the message indeed come from k and be
broadcast at Tr. In this case the conflict is implicit. To discover the implicit conflict
u has to consult other nodes that received the conflicting message. If u detects a
conflict it sends a conflict message.
A universe is a subset of neighbors that do not conflict. That is, a universe at
node u contains nodes v and w whose announcements u received such that u did
not receive a conflict from v about w or from w about v. Note that due to conflicts
the information collected by a single node may result in several different universes.
A universe is real if all nodes in it are real. A universe is complete for a node u if it
contains all of u’s correct neighbors. Note that even though a faulty node is real, it
can evade being added to universes by not sending any messages. Hence, a complete
universe is not required to contain all the real nodes, just correct ones.
Program locality. To preserve the locality of a solution to the neighborhood
discovery problem, we introduce the following requirement. Each node ignores in-
formation from the nodes outside the range rt and about the nodes outside the
neighborhood distance dn.
Problem statement. We define several variants of the problem. The strong neigh-
borhood discovery problem SNDP requires each correct node u to output its neigh-
borhood set according to the following properties:
safety — if the neighborhood set of u is output, the set contains only all correct
nodes and no fictitious nodes of u’s neighborhood;
liveness — every computation has a suffix in whose every state u outputs a neigh-
borhood set that contains all correct neighbors of u. In other words, u even-
tually outputs its complete neighborhood set.
This problem definition may be too strict. Some correct nodes may be slow in
announcing their presence. However, the safety property of SNDP requires each
node to wait for its slow neighbors before outputting the neighborhood set. Hence,
INRIA
Universe Detectors for Sybil Defense 9
we define the weak neighborhood discovery problem WNDP. This problem relaxes
the safety property to allow the output neighborhood set to contain a subset of
correct neighbors of u. Note that the presence of the fictitious nodes in the output is
still prohibited. Also note that the liveness property requires that the neighborhood
set of u in WNDP eventually contains all correct neighbors. Further relaxation of
the safety property yields the eventual neighborhood discovery problem ⋄NDP. It
requires that the safety of SNDP be satisfied only in the suffix of a computation.
That is ⋄NDP allows the correct nodes to output incorrect information arbitrarily
long before providing correct output. Observe that any solution to SNDP is also a
solution to WNDP, and any solution to WNDP is also a solution to ⋄NDP.
3 Impossibility of Standalone Solution to Neighborhood
Discovery
In this section we demonstrate that in the asynchronous system any correct node is
incapable of discovering its neighborhood if a faulty node is present. The intuition
for this result is as follows. Since a faulty node is not restricted in the number
of messages that it generates, it can send an arbitrary number of announcements
introducing fictitious nodes. The faulty node can then imitate arbitrary message
traffic between these non-existent nodes. On its own, a correct node is not able to
differentiate these fictitious nodes from the real ones.
Theorem 1 In an asynchronous system, none of the three variants of the neigh-
borhood discovery problem are deterministically solvable in the presence of a single
Byzantine fault.
Proof: We provide the proof for the eventual neighborhood discovery problem.
Since this problem is the weakest of the three that we defined, the impossibility of
its solution implies similar impossibility for the other two.
Assume the opposite. Let A be a deterministic algorithm that solves ⋄NDP in
the presence of a faulty node. Let us consider an arbitrary layout L1 that contains a
faulty node f . Let us consider another layout L2 containing f such that the neigh-
borhood U1 in layout L1 of at least one correct node u differs from its neighborhood
U2 in L2 and this difference includes at least one correct node. Without loss of
generality we can assume that there exists a correct node v such that v ∈ U1 and
v 6∈ U2.
We construct two computations of A: σ1 on layout L1 and σ2 on layout L2. The
construction proceeds by iteratively enlarging the prefixes of the two computations.
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In each iteration, we consider the last state of the prefix of σ1 constructed so far
and find the action that was enabled for the longest number of consequent steps. If
there are several such actions, we choose one arbitrarily. We attach the execution
of this action to the prefix of σ1. If this action is a message transmission of a node
w such that w ∈ U1, we also attach the following action execution to the prefix of
σ2: node f sends exactly the same message as w in σ1 with the TSS selected as
T = Tr|uf |2/|uw|2. Observe that u receives the same message and with the same
RSS in this step of σ2 as in the step added to σ1. If the new action attached to
σ1 prefix is not by a node in U1, or it is not a message transmission, no action is
attached to the prefix of σ1. We perform similar operations to the prefix of σ2.
We continue this iterative process until maximal computations σ1 and σ2 are
obtained. Observe that by construction, both computations are weakly fair compu-
tations of A. Moreover, in both cases u receives exactly the same messages with
exactly the same RSS.
By assumption, A is a solution to ⋄NDP. According to the liveness property of
the problem, σ1 has a suffix where u outputs its neighborhood in every state and,
due to the liveness property, σ1 contains a suffix where u’s neighborhood set contains
all correct nodes. In layout L1 of σ1, v is u’s correct neighbor. Hence, v has to be
included in this set. That is, there is a suffix of σ1 where u outputs a neighborhood
set that contains v. However, u receives the same messages in σ2. Since A is
deterministic, u has to output exactly the same set in σ2 as well. That is, σ2
contains a suffix where the neighborhood set also contains v. However, v is fictitious
in layout L2 of σ2. According to the safety property of ⋄NDP, every computation
should contain a suffix where the neighborhood set of u excludes fictitious nodes.
That is, σ2 of A violates the safety of ⋄NDP. Hence, our assumption that A is
a solution to the weak neighborhood discovery problem is incorrect. The theorem
follows. 2
4 Abstract Universe Detectors
Definitions. The negative result of Theorem 1 hinges on the ability of a faulty
node to introduce an arbitrary number of fictitious nodes. A correct node cannot
distinguish them from its real neighbors. Still, a correct node may be able to detect
conflicts between nodes and separate them into universes. However, it needs help
deciding which universe is real. This leads us to introduce the concept of a universe
detector that enables the solution to the neighborhood discovery problem in the
asynchronous computation model. A universe detector indicates to each correct
INRIA
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node which universe is real. It takes the universes collected by the node as input and
outputs which universe contains only real nodes. That is, a universe detector points
to the real universe. Note that the algorithm still has to collect the neighborhood
information and separate them into universes such that at least one of them is real.
If the algorithm does not provide a real universe, the detector does not help.
Depending on the quality of the output, we define the following detector classes.
For each node u, a strongly perfect universe detector SPU has the following prop-
erties:
completeness — if a computation contains a suffix where in every state, u outputs
a real and complete universe, then this computation also contains a suffix where
SPU at u points to it;
accuracy — if SPU points to a universe, this universe is real and complete.
The strongly perfect universe detector may be too restrictive or too difficult to
implement. Unlike SPU , a weakly perfect universe detector WPU may point to a
real universe even if it is not complete. That is, the definition of accuracy is relaxed
to allow the detector to point to a real universe that is not complete. Note that
WPU still satisfies the completeness property and has to eventually point to the
real universe if it is available. A further relaxation of completeness and accuracy
yields an eventually perfect universe detector ⋄PU which satisfies both properties in
a suffix of every computation. Observe that the relationship between these detector
classes is as follows: SPU ⊂ WPU ⊂ ⋄PU
Observe that these universe detectors enable a trivial solution to the neighbor-
hood discovery problems: each node composes a universe for every possible combina-
tion of the nodes that claim to be in its neighborhood. Naturally, as the node receives
announcements from all its correct neighbors, one of these universes is bound to be
real and complete. Hence, the detector can point to it. However, such an approach
essentially shifts the burden of separating fictitious and real nodes to the detector
while we are interested in minimizing the detector’s involvement. This leads us to
introduce an additional property of the algorithms that we consider. An algorithm
that solves the neighborhood discovery problem that uses detectors is conflict-aware
if for each universe U of node u, if nodes v and w do not have a conflict and v
belongs to U then w also belongs to U . That is, the algorithm does not gratuitously
separate non-conflicting neighbors into different universes. In what follows we focus
on conflict-aware solutions.
RR n° 6529
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5 Necessary Node Density
Theorem 1 demonstrates that to solve the neighborhood discovery problem, any
algorithm requires outside help from a construct like a universe detector. However,
the availability of a universe detector may not be sufficient. Faulty nodes may take
advantage of a layout to announce a fictitious node without generating conflicts.
Then, a correct node running a conflict aware algorithm never removes this ficti-
tious node from the real universe. A universe detector then cannot point to such a
universe.
To illustrate the idea we start with a sequence of fictitious node placement ex-
amples.
5.1 Fictitious Nodes Placement Examples
For this discussion we consider the neighborhood of a certain correct node u and a
faulty node f that tries to compromise u’s neighborhood discovery. We denote x,
y, z — the correct nodes in the neighborhood of u that that are respectively first,
second and third nearest to f . Note that to affect u, the faulty node f does not
itself have to be the neighbor of u. Our analysis proceeds according to the number
of correct receivers of messages sent by f .
Single correct receiver. Refer to Figure 1 for illustration. Note that due to the
broadcast nature of radio signal propagation, if any correct node receives a message
sent by f , x also receives this message because it is closest to f . Therefore, the
single correct receiver may only be x. Note, that for y to not receive the signal from
f , the transmission signal strength should be sufficiently low. Recall that a correct
node always broadcasts with pre-defined signal strength Tr. Thus, to deceive x, f
has to select the location of k and the TSS such that: (i) the RSS at x is the same
as if k transmitted with Tr and (ii) the RSS at y is below Rmin. For the received
signal strength at y to be less than Rmin, k cannot be closer to x than |fy|. On
the other hand, the location of k cannot be outside the range rt (or else x generates
conflict) or outside the neighborhood distance dn (or else x ignores it). Thus, the
possible location of k is a ring around x with the inner radius |fy| and the outer
radius — min(rt, dn).
Two correct receivers. If there are exactly two correct receivers, they are the
two nodes x and y nearest to f . Assume that f makes two transmissions at signal
strengths T1 and T2. For these transmissions, the RSS at x and y are Rx1, Ry1 and
INRIA
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Figure 1: Deception field with a single correct node x.
Rx2, Ry2 respectively. From the signal attenuation in Formula 1 we obtain:
|fy|
|fx| =
√
Rx1
Ry1
=
√
Rx2
Ry2
That is, regardless of transmission power, the ratio of received signal strengths at
x and y does not change. Hence, f may select the location of the fictitious node
k such that it preserves this ratio. Such locations form an arc of a circle. Refer
to Figure 2. The center of the circle lies on the line whose segment is (xy). The
radius of the circle is ba/(b − a) where b and a are the portions of (xy) such that
b/a = |fy|/|fx|. This circle is the deception circle. Note that f may not be able
to use all of the deception circle for fictitious node placement: to get both x and y
to receive the signal without generating conflicts the points on the arc have to lie
within min(rt, dn) of both x and y. Moreover, similar to the single-receiver case,
the portion of the arc that is closer to y than |fz| cannot be used without z also
receiving the message.
More than two correct receivers. Note that if there are more than two correct
receivers, they can be considered pairwise. Each pair of correct receivers forms
its own deception circle. Note that k can only be placed at the intersection of all
RR n° 6529
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Figure 2: Deception field with a two-node retinue. Correct nodes x and y receive
transmissions of faulty node f , while z does not.
INRIA
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Figure 3: The location of a snare in case of multiple faulty nodes. The retinue of f1
is x and y. The retinue of f2 is z. The intersection of deception fields produces area
where a snare can be placed.
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these circles. Note, however, that the circles intersect in the same place only if the
recipients are co-linear.
Snare. A faulty node may affect the correct nodes around it. A set Ef of correct
nodes is the retinue of a faulty node f if the following holds: if a correct node u
belongs to Ef , then every correct node v such that |vf | ≤ |uf |, also belongs to Ef .
The faulty node is the leader of the retinue. For example, assume there are two faulty
nodes f1 and f2 and three correct nodes u, v and w such that |f1u| < |f1v| < |f1w|
and |f2w| < |f2v| < |f2u|. Refer to Figure 3 for illustration. All three correct nodes
can be either in the retinue Ef1 of f1 or Ef2 of f2. However, if v belongs of Ef1, so
does u, and if u belongs to Ef2, so do v and w.
A deception field for a retinue of a faulty node f is the area such that for each
point k of the field there exists a TSS that the leader of the retinue can use to
transmit a message. The message so transmitted generates the RSS at each member
of the retinue as if the message was sent from k with transmission strength Tr.
Intuitively, a deception field is the area where f can place fictitious nodes without
generating conflicts at its retinue members.
A point k in a neighborhood of a correct node u is a (simple) snare for u if there
exists a set of faulty nodes and a retinue assignment for them such that: u is in one
of the retinues and the intersection of the deception fields of the retinues includes
k. Note that the nodes in range of k are either in the retinues or not. Intuitively,
a snare is a point where faulty nodes can jointly place a fictitious node without
generating explicit conflicts at any of the correct neighbors of u. Refer to Figure 3
for illustration. Note that some of the nodes may have implicit conflicts with k.
That is, they are within range rt of k and u but not in one of the retinues. That is,
they should receive a message from a node at k but they do not. Note that a snare
transmission from faulty nodes may still generate conflicts outside the range of u.
However, due to the locality assumption, u ignores this conflict.
A point k is a perfect snare for u if it is a snare and all nodes within the trans-
mission range of u and k are in the retinues of the faulty nodes participating in
the snare. That is, if faulty nodes broadcast in a perfect snare, neither explicit nor
implicit conflicts are generated at the neighbors of u.
Evaluating fault tolerance of a layout. To illustrate the concept of a snare, let
us discuss a square grid layout (refer to Figure 4). Let s be the distance between
the nodes in the grid. Note that for a node to have any neighbors, the neighborhood
distance dn has to be no less than s. Let s ≤ dn < s
√
2. For simplicity, let rt = dn.
Then each node has exactly four neighbors. Note that the failure of a single node
INRIA
Universe Detectors for Sybil Defense 17
Figure 4: The possibility of a snare in a grid layout with dn = 1.5s.
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creates a wedge-shaped deception field around the faulty node. Thus, with this
distance the layout is not fault tolerant.
Let us consider the case where s
√
2 ≤ dn < 2s and again rt = dn. In this
case, the neighborhood can withstand a failure of exactly one node. Indeed, assume
that a single node failed. Note that we have to consider the collusion of this faulty
node with arbitrary faulty nodes outside the neighborhood. Let us focus on the
neighborhood of node u5. For u5 to consider a fictitious node, the transmission of at
least one faulty node has to reach u5. However, if a signal from a faulty node, either
inside or outside the neighborhood of u5, reaches u5, then this signal is received by
at least two more correct neighbors of u5. Moreover, the three correct nodes that
receive this signal are non-collinear. This means that their pairwise deception circles
intersect only in the sender itself. Thus, the neighborhood of u5 does not contain a
snare.
Let us determine if this grid layout can withstand simultaneous failure of two
nodes in the same neighborhood. Let dn = rt be 1.5s. Suppose nodes u1 and u4 fail.
The deception field of u1 with u2 in its retinue is a disk with outer circle radius 1.5s
and inner — s
√
2. That is, the outer disk is the range for correct nodes rt = dn and
the inner is the distance to the next nearest node — u5. A similar disk is a deception
field of u4 for u5. The intersection of the two disks forms the area where a perfect
snare for u5 may be located. To use the snare, u1 sends messages to u2, and u4 to
u5 with the appropriate TSS pretending that the messages come from a fictitious
node located in the snare. Thus, the grid layout with such dn cannot withstand a
two-node failure.
5.2 Necessary Node Density Condition
Having described the required instruments, we now demonstrate that the availability
of the universe detectors alone is not sufficient to enable a solution to any of the
neighborhood discovery problems if the node layout is too sparse. That is, if the
nodes are not properly positioned on the plane.
To simplify the proof we consider solutions that are well-formed. An algorithm
is well-formed if (i) the action that transmits announcement is always enabled until
executed; (ii) the receipt of a message may enable either confirm or conflict, this
action stays enabled until executed.
Theorem 2 There is no conflict-aware well-formed deterministic solution to any of
the neighborhood discovery problems despite the availability of the universe detectors
if one of the considered layouts contains a perfect snare.
INRIA
Universe Detectors for Sybil Defense 19
Proof: In the proof, we focus again on the weakest of the problems: the eventual
neighborhood discovery. Assume the opposite: there is a conflict-aware well-formed
algorithm A that uses a detector and solves the problem even though in one of the
layouts L1, the neighborhood of a correct node u contains a perfect snare k.
Consider a layout L2 that is identical to L1 except that there is a correct node
at location k in L2. We construct a computation σ2 of A on L2 as follows. Faulty
nodes do not send any messages in σ2. We arrange the neighbors of u, including u
itself, into an arbitrary sequence Q. We then build the prefix of σ2 by iterating over
this sequence. Since A is well-formed, each node in the sequence has announcement
enabled. We add the action execution that transmits announcement to σ2 in the
order of nodes in Q. Since A is well-formed, these transmissions may enable confirm
actions at the neighbors of u. Note that since v is correct, conflict actions are not
enabled by these transmissions. We now iterate over the nodes in Q. For each node
v we add the execution of these confirm actions at v to σ2 in arbitrary fixed order,
for example in the order that the original senders the appear in Q. We proceed
in this manner until the sequence Q is exhausted. Note that these transmissions
may potentially generate another round of confirm messages at the nodes in Q. We
continue iterating over Q until no more messages are generated. We then complete
σ2 by executing the actions of nodes in an arbitrary fair manner. Note that the
remaining messages deal with the nodes outside u’s neighborhood. Therefore, u
ignores them.
Now, the liveness property of all the detectors states that a detector points to
a universe if it is output for a suffix of the computation. Since A is a solution of
⋄NDP and σ2 is a computation of A, σ2 has to contain a suffix where u outputs a
real universe in every state. Since k is a correct neighbor of u, k is included in the
real universe.
Recall that in layout L1, point k is a perfect snare. This means that there is an
arrangement of retinues and the TSS for the faulty nodes, such that when the faulty
nodes transmit, each node in the neighborhood of u in the distance d from k receives
a message with the same RSS as if a node at k broadcast with Td. Moreover, none
of the nodes in the neighborhood of u detect conflicts.
We construct a computation σ1 of A on layout L1 as follows. We iterate over
the same sequence Q as in σ2. Note that k is also present in the sequence even
though it is fictitious in σ1. To build the prefix of σ1 we execute similar actions as
for σ2. The only difference is that when node k broadcasts in σ2, in σ1 we have the
faulty nodes that constitute the snare broadcast at the appropriate TSS. Note that
in the computation thus formed, the correct neighbors of u receive messages at the
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same RSS and with the same content from the faulty nodes as in σ2 from k. Thus,
these transmissions do not generate conflicts. Observe that this means that node u
receives the same messages with the same RSS, and in the same sequence in σ1 and
σ2. Since A is deterministic, u has to output the same universes in σ1 and σ2. Note
also, that this means that u does not record conflicts. Since A is conflict aware, all
u’s universes of A include k together with the correct neighbors.
However, k is a fictitious node in L1. This means that σ1 contains a suffix where
u does not output a real universe. According to the safety property of the detectors,
none of them provides output in a suffix of σ1. Which means that A does not output
a neighborhood set in a suffix of σ1. This violates the liveness property of a solution
to ⋄NDP. Therefore, our assumption that A is a solution to ⋄NDP is incorrect.
The theorem follows. 2
6 Necessary Transmission Range
In this section we provide another required condition for the existence of a solu-
tion to the neighborhood discovery problem. Essentially, if the nodes in the same
neighborhood are out of range, the faulty node may introduce a conflict between
them. This forces the algorithm to mistakenly split the correct nodes into separate
universes and renders the failure detector powerless.
Theorem 3 There is no conflict-aware deterministic solution for any of the neigh-
borhood discovery problems despite the availability of universe detectors and lack of
snares if the node transmission range rt is less than double the neighborhood distance
dn.
Proof: Consider the eventual neighborhood discovery and assume that there is
an algorithm A that solves the problem in the presence of detectors on any layout
without snares yet the transmission range of the correct nodes rt is less than 2dn.
Consider the layout L1 where the neighborhood of a correct node u contains two
nodes v and f1 as well as a point k with the following properties. Refer to Figure 5
for illustration. As usual, v is correct, f1 is faulty and there is no node at point k.
Even though point k is in the neighborhood of u, it is out of range of v. That is,
rt < |vk|. Recall that this is possible since, by assumption, rt < 2dn. Node f1 is
such that |uf1| = |uk| and rt > |vf1|. The rest of the correct nodes in range of u are
located such that, with the exception of v, k forms a perfect snare for u. That is,
if f1 sends a message from a fictitious node k, the only node that generates conflict
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Figure 5: Insufficient range for recognition of faulty node. Illustration to the proof
of Theorem 3.
is v. Certainly, with the presence of v, k is not a snare so the assumptions of the
theorem apply.
Consider that f1 indeed sends announcement pretending to be a fictitious node
at k. Nodes f1 and k are equidistant from u. Thus, if f1 does not want u to detect a
conflict, f1 has to send the signal with the TSS of Tr. However, with such TSS, v is
in range of f1 but out of range of k. This means that v receives the announcement
ostensibly coming from k and detects a conflict. The RSS at v is cTr/|vf1|2. Since
A is a solution to the neighborhood discovery problem and v is the only node that
is aware of the conflict, v has to send conflict to u which removes the fictitious node
k from the real universe of u.
Consider a different layout L2 (refer to Figure 5) which is similar to L1, only point
k is occupied by a correct node and there is a faulty node f2 near v. Specifically,
the distance |vf2| is such that there are no correct nodes within the following range
of f2:
|vf2|
|vf1|
√
c
Rmin
This ensures that when f2 is going to imitate node k, none of the nodes besides v
receive the messages from f2. Note that f2 and k still do not form a snare because
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v is aware of the conflict. Note also, that such location of f2 can always be found if
the faulty node can be placed arbitrarily close to v.
Assume that if the node k in L2 sends a message, f2 replicates this message with
TSS
Tr|vf2|2
|vf1|2
Observe that in this case all nodes, including v and u, receive exactly the same
messages as in layout L1. Since A is deterministic, the nodes have to act exactly
as in the previous case. That is, v has to issue a conflict with the message of
node k. However, after receiving this conflict, k is separated from u’s real universe.
Recall that k is correct in layout L2. Note that in this case k is never going to be
added to the output of A at u. However, this violates the liveness property of the
neighborhood discovery problem since k is a correct neighbor of u. Thus, A is not
a solution to this problem as we initially assumed. 2
7 The Sybil Attack Resilient Neighborhood Discovery
Algorithm SAND
Our description of the algorithm proceeds as follows. We first motivate the need
to frugally encode the universes to be passed to the universes detectors. We then
describe the operation of the neighborhood detection algorithm itself. Then, we
define the concrete implementations of the abstract detectors specified in Section 4.
These concrete detectors should operate with our algorithm. On the basis of the
algorithm and detector description we state the theorem of algorithm correctness
and detector optimality.
Encoding universes. Observe that a na¨ive solution for representing universes by
the algorithm results in an exponential number of universes. Indeed, assume that
node u compiled a set of nodes U that do not conflict with two nodes v and w.
Suppose now that u records a conflict between the two nodes. They thus have to
be placed in separate universes: U ∪ {v} and U ∪ {w}. Let us consider another pair
of conflicting nodes x and y that are different from v and w. Then, there are four
possible universes: U ∪ {vx}, U ∪ {vy}, U ∪ {wx}, and U ∪ {wy}. Hence, if there
are N nodes in the neighborhood of u, the potential number of conflicting pairs is
⌊N/2⌋ and the number of universes is 2⌊N/2⌋.
Therefore, our algorithm encodes the universes in the conflicts that are passed
to the detector. That is, the algorithm passes a set of conflicts for the detector to
generate the appropriate universe on its own.
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Recall also that in an asynchronous radio network the receiving node can not
distinguish one sender from another or decide if the two messages were sent by the
same node. This task has to be handled by the detector.
Algorithm description. We assume that the necessary conditions for the existence
of a solution to the neighborhood discovery problem are satisfied: the layout does
not contain a (simple) snare and transmission range is at least twice as large as the
neighborhood distance dn.
The SAND algorithm operates as follows. Every message transmitted by the
node contains its coordinates. Each node sends announce. After receiving an an-
nounce, a node replies with a confirm message. Each confirm contains the infor-
mation of the announcement. If a node receives a message whose coordinates do
not match the received signal strength, the node replies with a conflict message.
The conflict also contains the information of the message that generated the con-
flict. Observe that confirm can only be generated by announce while conflict can be
generated by an arbitrary message. Note that according to the locality assumption
every node ignores messages from the nodes outside of its neighborhood distance dn.
Each node u builds a message dependency directed graph DEP. For each confirm,
u finds a matching announce; for each conflict — a matching message that caused
the conflict. Note that this message dependence may not be unique. For example
a faulty node may send a message identical to a message sent by a correct node.
Since a node cannot differentiate senders in asynchronous radio networks, identical
messages are merged in DEP. Note also, that a match may not be found because
the faulty node may send a spurious conflict message or the conflict message is
in reply to the faulty node message that u does not receive. Node u removes the
unmatched message. Also, u removes the cycles and sinks of DEP that are not
announce. Observe that DEP may grow indefinitely as faulty nodes can continue to
send arbitrary messages.
Due to no-snare and transmission range assumptions, for every correct process
u the following is guaranteed about DEP :
 Eventually, u receives an announcement from every correct node in its neigh-
borhood. An announcement from each correct node will be confirmed by every
correct node. There will be no messages from the correct nodes that conflict
with any other messages from the correct nodes.
 Eventually, every message from a fictitious node will be followed up by at least
one conflict message sent by one of the correct nodes from the neighborhood
of u.
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Concrete universe detectors. We define the concrete detectors cSPU , cWPU
and ⋄cPU as the detectors that accept the DEP provided by SAND as input and
whose output satisfies the specification of the corresponding abstract detectors de-
scribed in Section 4. That is, for each correct node u, cSPU only outputs complete
and real universe, cWPU may output a real universe that is not complete, while
⋄cPU may provide arbitrary output for a fixed number of computation states. How-
ever, all three detectors eventually output the complete and real universe for u.
Observe that the detectors have to comply with the specification even though DEP
may grow infinitely large.
In SAND, each process u observes the output of the detector and immediately
outputs the universe presented by the detector without further modification. By the
construction of SAND proves the following theorem.
Theorem 4 Considering layouts without simple snares and assuming that the trans-
mission range is at least twice as large as the neighborhood distance, the Sybil Attack
Neighborhood Detection Algorithm SAND provides a conflict-aware deterministic
solution to the Neighborhood Discovery Problem as follows: SNDP if cSPU detec-
tor is used; WNDP if cWPU is used; and ⋄NDP if ⋄cPU is used.
Similar to Chandra et al [3] we can introduce the concept of a weakest universe
detector needed to solve a certain problem. A universe detector U is the weakest
detector required to solve a problem P if the following two properties hold:
 there is an algorithm A that uses U to solve P;
 there is another algorithm B that uses the input of an arbitrary solution S of
P to implement U .
That is, B uses the output of S and provides the computations expected of U . The
intuition is that if any solution can be used to implement U , then every solution
needs the strength of at least U . Hence, the idea that U is the weakest detector.
Observe that SAND provides the solutions using these detectors to the respec-
tive problems. Note also that the outputs of the neighborhood discovery problems
that we defined SNDP, WNDP and ⋄NDP can be used as the respective universe
detectors SPU , WPU and ⋄PU . For example, if a process u in SNDP outputs its
neighborhood set, this neighborhood set can be used to point to the real universe.
Hence the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Concrete universe detectors cSPU , cWPU and ⋄cPU are the weak-
est detectors required to solve SNDP, WNDP and ⋄NDP respectively.
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8 Detector Implementation and Future Research
Detector implementation. According to Theorem 1, the universe detectors em-
ployed by our solution to the neighborhood discovery problem are not themselves
implementable in asynchronous systems. The actual implementation of the detec-
tors can depend on the particular properties of the application. Here are a few
possible ways of constructing the detectors. The nodes may be aware of the bounds
on faulty nodes speed. That is, the detectors will know the maximum number of
fictitious nodes they have to deal with. The nodes may contain some topological
knowledge of the network. For example, the nodes may know that the network is a
grid. Alternatively, the nodes may have secure communication with several trusted
neighbors to ensure their presence in the selected universe.
Future research. We conclude the paper by outlining several interesting areas of
research that our study suggests. Even though the concrete detectors we describe
in the paper are minimal from the application perspective, it is unclear if the input
that SAND provides is optimal. That is, is there any other information that can be
gathered in the asynchronous model that can help the detector decide if a certain
universe is real. We suspect that SAND provides the maximum possible information
but we would like to rigorously prove it.
In this study, we assume completely reliable communication within a certain
radius of the transmitting node Rmin. However, in practice the propagation patterns
of low-power wireless radios used in sensor and other ad hoc networks are highly
irregular. See for example Zhou et al [28]. The problem of adapting a more realistic
communication model is left open.
Another question is the true relationship between the universe and fault detec-
tors. Observe that unlike fault detectors, the universe detectors require additional
layout properties to enable the solution to the neighborhood discovery. It would
be interesting to research if there is a complete analogue to fault detectors for this
problem.
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